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WHAT REGULATORY PROBLEMS ARISE WHEN FINTECH 
LENDING EXPANDS INTO FLEDGLING CREDIT MARKETS? 
 
Jonathan Greenacre* 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
Fintech lending, which involves non-bank firms providing credit to 
consumers, has expanded rapidly around the world. Between 2013 and 
2016, fintech credit increased from $11 billion to $284 billion.1 
This article argues that when moving into fledgling credit markets—
namely communities in which a significant portion of the population has 
never had access to formal consumer loans—fintech lending can cause 
significant adverse economic consequences to the public and create 
significant regulatory gaps that require addressing. These economic 
consequences include inaccurate risk-pricing as firms determine how to 
accurately process and use the range of information at their disposal as well 
as potential behavioral problems leading to widespread default as members 
of low-income communities, particularly those without a bank account (the 
so-called “unbanked”), access formal credit for the first time. Regulatory 
gaps emerge because supervisory frameworks tend to focus on consumer 
credit emerging from the banking sector, not fintech.  
This article focuses on the spread of fintech lending in Kenya since 2012 
as a case study for its broader argument. Over fifty lenders have entered the 
Kenyan consumer credit market. The majority of these lenders are fintech 
firms (also known as “fintechs”). Many of these digital lenders have grown 
rapidly. For example, one company, Branch, was launched in Kenya in 
2015 and by January 2019 had issued over ten million loans.2  
 
 
*  Hitachi Faculty Fellow, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. The 
author would like to thank Shashank Reddy Ramireddy for his helpful research assistance. All errors 
remain my own.  
1. Stijn Claessens, Jon Frost, Grant Turner & Feng Zhu, Fintech Credit Markets Around the 
World: Size, Drivers and Policy Issues, BIS Q. REV., Sept. 2018. 
2. Branch International Raises KSH 500M; Issues 10 Millionth Loan in Kenya, NAIROBI 
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The policy implication from this article is that regulatory frameworks for 
fintech lending may require fresh thinking, involving moving away from 
bank-based approaches. But there is little guidance on what form such 
frameworks should take. This is because mass consumer credit is relatively 
new in Kenya and there is little data on how consumers analyze and use 
loans. In addition, while regulatory frameworks for banks in Kenya have 
evolved, regulatory thinking about fintechs is relatively underdeveloped. 
This article examines potential starting points for developing regulatory 
frameworks for fintech lending. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Non-bank (so-called “fintech,” for “financial technology”) firms provide 
a small but growing portion of consumer credit. Globally, between 2013 and 
2016, fintech credit increased from $11 billion to $284 billion.3 Lending 
from fintech firms accounted for a third of unsecured personal loans in 2017 
in the United States.4  Fintech lending comprised fifteen percent of total 
lending to consumers and small- and medium-sized enterprises in the UK in 
2016.5  
Fintech lending is novel because it usually does not require formal 
collateral.6 Instead, fintech lending platforms provide unsecured personal 
loans and tend to charge higher interest rates than other formal financial 
institutions such as banks, although the precise form of such loans can vary 
significantly.7  
 
 
GARAGE (Jan. 14, 2019), https://nairobigarage.com/branch-international-raises-ksh500m/ 
[https://perma.cc/VQ6R-ZSET]. 
3. Claessens et al., supra note 1. 
4. John Detrixhe, Americans are Splurging on Personal Loans Thanks to Fintech Startups, 
QUARTZ (July 24, 2018), https://qz.com/1334899/personal-loans-are-surging-in-the-us-fueled-by-
fintech-startups/ [https://perma.cc/6JS2-Q3RD]. 
5. Claessens et al., supra note 1, at 34. 
6. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE FUTURE OF FINTECH: A PARADIGM SHIFT IN SMALL 
BUSINESS FINANCE (2015), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/IP/2015/FS/GAC15_The_Future_of_FinTech_Paradigm_Shift_Small_
Business_Finance_report_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/823C-9BN8]. 
7. Some fintech firms do not act as regular financial lenders. For example, Prosper acts as an 
intermediary between borrowers and private investors willing to lend their money. This means it holds 
no money of its own nor does it lend its own money. Instead, Prosper acts as an underwriter and profits 
from fees charged. See Legal Compliance, PROSPER FUNDING LLC, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/16
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The growth of fintech lending will eventually require policymakers in the 
United States and other developed countries to explore risks and appropriate 
regulatory frameworks, but there is little guidance on these issues. This is 
because, traditionally, consumer credit has been overwhelmingly bank-
based.8   
Developing regions, particularly Africa, provide insights on potential 
regulatory problems that can emerge when fintechs provide a much bigger 
proportion of consumer credit than what we normally observe in a 
developed country. This is because the relative lack of penetration of the 
banking system in Africa has created a vacuum into which fintechs have 
begun to spread.9 Even as late as 2014 the majority of the population was 
“unbanked,” meaning they did not have an account with a formal financial 
institution.10 Likewise, just fifteen percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s 
population obtained consumer credit from formal financial institutions, 
specifically banks.11  
Technological change, particularly the spread of mobile phones and 
related payment services, infrastructure developments, and regulatory 
amendments have enabled fintechs to enter African jurisdictions and 
provide growing numbers of loans.12 The number of mobile phones in 
 
 
https://www.prosper.com/plp/legal/compliance/ [https://perma.cc/QNE9-5LVX]. Conversely, Avant, 
another fintech lender, uses its own funds to provide loans to consumers. See Peter Rudegair & Telis 
Demos, Funding Deal Values Avant at Nearly $2 Billion, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 29, 2015, 7:10 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/funding-deal-values-avant-at-nearly-2-billion-1443568252. Interest rates 
usually range from 9.95% to 35.99%. Our Rates and Terms, AVANT, 
https://www.avant.com/rates_terms [https://perma.cc/8SSM-M527].  
8. Christian Löw, How Traditional Lenders Can Find New Opportunities in Consumer 
Financing, EY (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.ey.com/en_gl/banking-capital-markets/how-traditional-
lenders-can-find-new-opportunities-in-consumer-financing [https://perma.cc/E2HZ-6RR5]. 
9. LUCY CORKIN, FINANCING DEVELOPMENT: FINTECH IN AFRICA, OBSERVER RESEARCH 
FOUND. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 284 (2019), https://www.orfonline.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/ORF_IssueBrief_284_Fintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA4G-XCMX]. 
10. In 2014, only fifty-five percent of the region’s adults had a formal financial account. See 
Financial Inclusion Data—Kenya, WORLD BANK, 
http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/country/kenya [https://perma.cc/4DFC-6L9J]. 
11. Id.; Peer Stein, Access to Finance: Sub-Saharan Africa, (World Bank Grp., Working Paper 
No. 94882, 2013), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/599611468202144127/Access-to-
finance-Sub-Saharan-Africa [https://perma.cc/V3MP-437D]. 
12. Stuart Jackson, Three Reasons Why Fintech Is Driving Change in Africa, FINEXTRA (June 
10, 2019), https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/17342/three-reasons-why-fintech-is-driving-change-
in-africa [https://perma.cc/P3MY-PTX9]. 
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Africa went from virtually zero in 2006 to 444 million by 2017.13 Greater 
use of mobile phones generated a range of information on the population, 
such as their contacts, spending habits, and location history that banks and 
later fintech firms could use to screen potential borrowers.14 “Mobile 
money” was a related development. Mobile money is a mobile phone-based 
payment service that spread quickly throughout Africa.15 By 2018 around 
ten percent of the GDP in sub-Saharan Africa occurred through mobile 
money.16 As will be explored below, a combination of mobile phone and 
mobile money usage has helped stimulate the design of innovative fintech 
lending models, which have enjoyed considerable growth across Africa. 
This article focuses on Kenya as a case study for its broader claim, which 
is that when moving into new credit markets—whether in Kenya or more-
developed countries—fintech lending can cause significant adverse 
economic consequences to the public and create significant regulatory gaps 
that require addressing. These economic consequences include inaccurate 
risk pricing as fintech firms determine how to accurately process and use 
the vast range of information at their disposal, and potential behavioral 
problems leading to widespread default as low-income communities, 
particularly the unbanked, access formal credit for the first time. Kenya is 
an appropriate case study of a “fledgling” credit market. This is because 
bank-based consumer credit has traditionally reached a small proportion of 
the economy, and the majority of lending has taken place through informal 
mechanisms.17 
 
 
13. Cesar Calderon, Gerard Kambou, Vijdan Korman, Megumi Kubota & Catalina Cantu 
Canales, An Analysis of Issues Shaping Africa’s Economic Future, AFRICA’S PULSE, Apr. 2019, at 94, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31499 [https://perma.cc/EL98-54WR]. 
14. Benno Ndulu & Tebello Qhotsokoane, Harnessing Fintech For A Big Leap In Financial 
Inclusion- Lessons From East African Success, PATHWAYS FOR PROSPERITY COMMISSION, 
https://pathwayscommission.bsg.ox.ac.uk/blog/harnessing-fintech-big-leap-financial-inclusion-
lessons-east-african-success [https://perma.cc/Z84W-T454]. 
15. Wiza Jalaski, After Years of Rapid Growth in Africa We’re About to Enter the Age of Mobile 
Money 2.0, QUARTZ AFRICA (Oct. 4, 2019), https://qz.com/africa/1721818/africa-mobile-money-
industry-is-entering-its-next-stage-of-growth/ [https://perma.cc/7BK9-SWY3]. 
16. Amadou N.R. Sy, Fintech in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Potential Game Changer, IMFBLOG, 
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://blogs.imf.org/2019/02/14/fintech-in-sub-saharan-africa-a-potential-game-
changer/ [https://perma.cc/S7H9-AKNC]. 
17. Isaac Wachira Mwangi, Determinants of Access to Credit by Individuals in Kenya: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Kenya National FinAccess Surveys of 2006 and 2009, 3 EUR. J. BUS. & 
MGMT., no. 3, 2011 at 206-227 (2011). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/16
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Policymakers in Kenya and other developing countries face complex 
trade-offs, particularly due to “financial inclusion” goals. “Financial 
inclusion” describes enabling unbanked communities to access financial 
services, including credit, for the first time.18 Financial inclusion is now a 
policy goal for more than eighty countries, including Kenya.19 As this article 
will explore, financial inclusion goals can conflict with consumer protection 
objectives, involving the use of regulatory intervention in fintech credit 
markets to address high default rates and extensive use of loans for non-
consumption purposes.20  
Furthermore, fintech lending has created a regulatory gap in Kenya. This 
is because the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK)—the main financial regulatory 
agency in Kenya—has legislative authority to regulate bank-based 
consumer credit and other financial credit products. Such authority would 
cover fintech firms, but this oversight is not exclusive and is shared by a 
number of other regulators including Kenya’s insurance and 
communication regulators.21This means that no single regulator has 
overarching responsibility for regulation of fintech products, which might 
allow a number of products to fall through regulatory gaps.22 
The policy implication is that—in contrast to financial inclusion goals—
regulatory frameworks for fintech credit require fresh thinking, which 
involves moving away from traditional bank-based approaches. However, 
there is little guidance on the potential forms of fresh thinking, given how 
 
 
18. Financial Inclusion, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL’S SPECIAL ADVOC. FOR 
INCLUSIVE FIN. FOR DEV., http://www.unsgsa.org/about/financial-inclusion, [https://perma.cc/2LT3-
792P]; see also Financial Inclusion Glossary, CTR. FOR FIN. INCLUSION AT ACCION (2019), 
https://www.centerforfinancialinclusion.org/financial-inclusion-glossary [https://perma.cc/TT3P-
YF2U] (“Financial inclusion” is  a “state in which all people who can use them have access to a full 
suite of quality financial services, provided at affordable prices, in a convenient manner, and with 
dignity for the clients.  Financial services are delivered by a range of providers, most of them private, 
and reach everyone who can use them, including disabled, poor, rural, and other excluded 
populations.”).  
19. Member Institutions, ALLIANCE FOR FIN. INCLUSION, https://www.afi-global.org/members/ 
[https://perma.cc/35J7-GUXG]. 
20. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Fintech Lending Risks and Benefits, THE FINREG BLOG (Nov. 18, 
2018), https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2018/11/14/fintech-lending-risks-and-benefits/ 
[https://perma.cc/369A-AV8X]. 
21. Sonal Sejpal & Dominic Rebello, Kenya: Fintech 2019, ICLG (May 10, 2019), 
https://iclg.com/practice-areas/fintech-laws-and-regulations/kenya [https://perma.cc/X4FW-LEAP]. 
22. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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little we understand about how people use fintech lending. This article 
examines potential avenues for this to take place. 
This article explores this argument by examining three models of digital, 
fintech-based credit that have emerged in Kenya. It explains that there are 
patterns across these models and explores their form and regulatory 
consequences.  It is organized into four parts. The first part describes 
traditional challenges involved in extending consumer credit in Kenya and 
explains how technology and regulatory amendments facilitated the growth 
of digital credit. The second part explores how fintech lending addresses 
several challenges that have traditionally impeded the extension of credit to 
Kenya. This section focuses on the three digital credit models. The third part 
explains several regulatory issues that have emerged through these and other 
fintech models in Kenya. Finally, the fourth part explores the policy 
implications of the rise of fintech lending and advocates for fresh thinking 
on regulatory frameworks for this sector.  
  
I. THE RISE OF FINTECH LENDING IN KENYA 
 
Like other African countries, access to formal consumer credit has been 
limited in Kenya, making it a fledgling consumer credit market suitable for 
analysis in this article.23 In 2014, when fintech-related consumer lending 
was launched in Kenya, only ten percent of the population borrowed money 
from a formal financial institution.24  
Without access to formal consumer credit, Kenyans have traditionally 
relied upon informal credit systems, which have tended to face a range of 
problems.25  People have traditionally used informal mechanisms of credit 
 
 
23. Expanding Access to Banking and Credit in Sub-Saharan Africa, THE OPIC BLOG (Oct. 23, 
2012), https://www.opic.gov/blog/opic-in-action/expanding-access-to-banking-and-credit-in-sub-
saharan-africa [https://perma.cc/QZB4-F8PG]. 
24. WORLD BANK, supra note 10.  
25. For example, in 2009, seventy-four percent of Kenyans used informal finance as a means of 
saving, as opposed to just thirty-six percent who used formal financial institutions to handle their affairs. 
Sources of such informal credit ranged from family and friends to Accumulated Savings and Credit 
Associations (ASCA). Even within these varied sources a majority of Kenyans who borrow from 
informal sources do so from their family and friends. See Isabella Chepkogei Sile & Julius Bett, 
Determinants of Informal Finance Use in Kenya, 6 RES. J. OF FIN. & ACCT., no. 7, 2015, at 6. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/16
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due to convenience, accessibility, and because usually interest is not 
charged on some informal loans.26  
Evidence suggests that informal sources of finance meet the immediate 
goals of borrowers but provide limited assistance in the long run.27 
Borrowing from informal sources can lead directly to greater investments 
in local agriculture and small enterprises, but also often appears to lead to 
debt spirals that compound existing problems of indebtedness.28  In 
particular, local money-lenders often charge high rates of interest which 
borrowers struggle to repay.29 Borrowing from family and friends is often 
interest-free, but puts social relations at risk in the case of a default.30   
Several supply-based economic and institutional factors impeded the 
efforts of financial institutions, particularly banks, to extend the reach of 
consumer credit to most of Kenya’s population. One factor has been a lack 
of information on the creditworthiness of Kenya’s population.31 Gathering 
this information in 2012 was costly because seventy-five percent of Kenya’s 
population lived in rural areas, far from physical infrastructure with little, if 
any, formal financial history and identification.32 Furthermore, banking 
outreach was limited. Kenya had 5.17 bank branches per 100,000 people, 
significantly lower than the global average of 11.14 branches per 100,000 
people.33 Further, Kenya had 9.51 ATMs per 100,000 people, significantly 
lower than the global average of 33.28.34 Unsurprisingly, then, a majority 
of the population was unbanked.35  
 
 
26. Isabella Chepkogei Sile & Julius Bett, Determinants of Informal Finance Use in Kenya, 6 
RES. J. OF FIN. & ACCT., no. 21, 2015, at 6, 7. 
27. Mwangi, supra note 17, at 206. 
28. GEORGE OWUOR & A.O. SHEM, INFORMAL CREDIT AND FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY IN AFRICA: 
DOES INFORMAL CREDIT MATTER? 5 (2012). 
29. Id. 
30. Alexander Karaivanov and Anke Kessler, (Dis)Advantages of Informal Loans-Theory and 
Evidence, 102 EUR. ECON. REV. 100 (2018).     
31. Mwangi, supra note 17. 
32. Rural Population – Kenya, WORLD BANK GRP., 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=KE [https://perma.cc/87PN-FAD5]. 
33. Commercial Bank Branches – Kenya, WORLD BANK GRP., 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.CBK.BRCH.P5?locations=KE [https://perma.cc/6XMR-
3CMJ]. 
34. Automated Teller Machines, WORLD BANK GRP., 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.ATM.TOTL.P5 [https://perma.cc/GQ6D-J7US]. 
35. Along with this, forty-two percent of the Kenyan population owned a bank account in 2011. 
See Global Financial Inclusion, WORLD BANK GRP., 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Banks faced high enforcement costs in relation to consumer credit due to 
the limitations of Kenya’s public infrastructure, institutions and 
enforcement. In 2018 for example, the average time to enforce a loan 
contract in Kenya was 429 days (about fourteen months),36 and the average 
cost of such enforcement was 40.7% of the claim value.37 By comparison, 
the average time to enforce a contract in the United States that year was 300 
days and the average cost was 18.4% of the claim value.38   
Several important factors have changed in Kenya in the last fifteen years, 
facilitating the entry of fintechs into the consumer credit sector of the 
economy. One of these is the rapid spread of mobile phones, which provided 
a great deal of additional information for bank and fintech lenders. Between 
2002 and 2006, the number of mobile phones in Kenya increased from one 
million to ten million.39 By 2018, mobile phone penetration in Kenya stood 
at over ninety percent, while internet penetration stood at eighty-four 
percent.40 Mobile money services expanded rapidly in Kenya. One service, 
M-Pesa, had over twenty-five million users by 2018, accounting for more 
than half of Kenya’s mobile users and providing a range of information on 
customers, later used by banks and other fintech firms, as explored below.41  
A second factor that has facilitated the entry of fintech lending is changes 
in Kenya’s regulatory arrangements. The CBK, the government agency 
tasked with a range of regulatory and supervisory oversight functions, 
permitted several different fintech-related lending services to emerge 
without substantive regulatory frameworks. For example, in 2010, the CBK 
allowed Equity Bank and Safaricom to partner in the launch of a mobile 
 
 
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=1228 [https://perma.cc/A9VF-JSDY]. 
36. Ease of Doing Business in Kenya, WORLD BANK GRP., 
https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/kenya# [https://perma.cc/32MB-BQ7X]. 
37. Id. 
38. Historical Data Sets and Trends Data, WORLD BANK GROUP, 
https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/custom-query [https://perma.cc/KT4J-9KU5]. 
39. Harry McGee, How the Mobile Phone Changed Kenya, IRISH TIMES (May 14, 2016), 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/africa/how-the-mobile-phone-changed-kenya-1.2646968 
[https://perma.cc/2NSJ-9AZT]. 
40. Pauline Masese & Lilian Makena, Kenya Mobile Report 2019, JUMIA (2019), 
https://www.jumia.co.ke/mobile-report/ [https://perma.cc/C4ZD-Y9R7]. 
41. George Obulutsa, M-Pesa Has Completely Changed Kenyans’ Access to Financial Services, 
This is How…, CNBC AFRICA (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/east-
africa/2019/04/03/m-pesa-has-completely-changed-kenyans-access-to-financial-services-this-is-how/ 
[https://perma.cc/HN8L-AYFY]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/16
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product called M-Kesho.42 In 2012, the CBK extended this permission to a 
partnership between the Commercial Bank of Africa and Safaricom, titled 
“M-Shwari” and described below.43 The CBK also permitted fintechs to 
enter the Kenyan market without imposing extensive regulatory 
frameworks for the sector.44 
A third change in Kenya’s consumer credit landscape was the 
establishment of three credit reference bureaus (CRBs).45 Kenya has three 
licensed CRBs—Creditinfo, Metropole, and Credit Reference Bureau 
Africa—which were all launched in 2010 by CBK.46 These actors enable 
financial institutions to share information about defaulters and the 
creditworthiness of consumers with each other.47 This is because all 
financial institutions must share all credit-related information with CRBs,  
including defaults. Other financial institutions can access this data when 
determining whether to provide digital credit to people.48  
Finally, technological developments have greatly reduced transaction 
costs in relation to processing information and developing credit scores. 
This is because technological innovations can process an increasing amount 
of information gathered digitally. However, these technological innovations 
still appear to be at an early stage, as will be discussed below.   
 
 
 
42. M-Kesho in Kenya: A New Step for M-Pesa and Mobile Banking, NYU WAGNER FIN. 
ACCESS INITIATIVE BLOG, (May 27, 2010), https://www.financialaccess.org/blog/2015/7/16/m-kesho-
in-kenya-a-new-step-for-m-pesa-and-mobile-banking [https://perma.cc/L4V5-HXTF].  
43. Safaricom, CBA Launch Groundbreaking Mobile Banking Service M-Shwari, AFI (Nov. 28, 
2012), https://www.afi-global.org/news/2012/11/safaricom-cba-launch-groundbreaking-mobile-
banking-service-m-shwari [https://perma.cc/376U-ULDC]. 
44. David Herbling & Zeke Faux, Kenya’s Mobile Lenders Could Be Supervised by Central 
Bank, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-24/kenya-
draft-law-proposes-central-bank-supervises-mobile-lenders [https://perma.cc/PA63-KVDK]. 
45. A CRB is an institution that has been established to monitor the behavior of borrowers and 
reduce the risk of loan default. The Credit Reference Bureau, CREDITINFO, 
https://ke.creditinfo.com/2019/03/04/credit-reference-bureau/ [https://perma.cc/6P8R-P47J]. 
46. Nancy Wanjiru Gaitho, Role of Credit Reference Bureaus on Credit Access in Kenya: A 
Survey of Commercial Banks in Kenya, EUR. SCI. J., May 2018, at 301, 303. The overarching regulation 
that governs the conduct and powers of the CRB is CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, CREDIT REFERENCE 
BUREAU REGULATIONS, 2019, https://www.centralbank.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/DRAFT-
CREDIT-REFERENCE-BUREAU-REGULATIONS-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/56YA-57MJ]. 
47. Jared Getenga, Parliamentary Petition To Disband The CRB Mechanism is Retrogessive, 
FSD KENYA BLOG (May 23 2019), https://fsdkenya.org/blog/parliamentary-petition-to-disband-the-crb-
mechanism-is-retrogressive/ [https://perma.cc/22K7-HHBA]. 
48. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. THE OPERATION OF FINTECH LENDING IN KENYA 
 
Fintech lending has significantly expanded the outreach of credit to low-
income and unbanked communities in Kenya, primarily because firms can 
calculate credit scores by using and processing information obtained 
through mobile phone-related technological innovations. Furthermore, 
technological development allows firms to quickly process such 
information and often provide credit scores within a few minutes to a few 
hours.49  
By relying on mobile phones, fintech lending enjoys demand-side 
benefits over traditional bank-based consumer credit. In particular, a 
customer can apply for a loan remotely using her phone without needing to 
incur the significant transportation costs she would otherwise face in 
reaching a bank branch to apply for a loan in person.50 This is a significant 
advantage given the relatively high proportion of the population that lives 
in rural areas in Kenya.51  
Initially, banks were at the forefront of making use of the supply and 
demand benefits of digital credit, particularly through partnering with 
mobile money providers.52 More recently, fintech firms have begun 
obtaining, processing and using information from a wider range of sources, 
including location information, phone contacts, and SMS history, for 
consumer credit-related purposes such as lending and setting interest rates.53 
The material below explores these models in greater depth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49. Greg Chen & Rafa Mazer, Instant, Automated, Remote: The Key Attributes of Digital Credit, 
CGAP BLOG (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.cgap.org/blog/instant-automated-remote-key-attributes-
digital-credit [https://perma.cc/J4HG-AQY8]. 
50. Di Lorenzo, supra note 20. 
51. As of 2018, 73% of Kenya’s population lived in rural areas. Rural Population, WORLD 
BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS [https://perma.cc/PZA4-JNUR]. 
52. Gerald Chappell et al., The Lending Revolution: How Digital Credit Is Changing Banks From 
the Inside, MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-
insights/the-lending-revolution-how-digital-credit-is-changing-banks-from-the-inside 
[https://perma.cc/4GLL-56J4]. 
53. See infra Sections II.B, II.C, and II.D (describing three modern lending programs in Kenya). 
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A. M-Shwari 
 
The Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) and Safaricom (a mobile network 
operator) launched M-Shwari in November 2012, making it the first mass 
digital credit service in Kenya.54  To launch M-Shwari, CBA and Safaricom 
leveraged their pre-existing relationship, which had emerged because 
Safaricom had stored all customers’ funds obtained through its M-Pesa 
product in a bank account with the CBA.55 Safaricom was gathering a 
significant amount of information through its M-Pesa product. In 2012, 
Safaricom had approximately 14.91 million subscribers in Kenya, whose 
information could be leveraged for additional purposes.56  
M-Shwari provides two related services. The first of these is a bank 
deposit. A borrower can transfer funds from her M-Pesa account to a linked 
M-Shwari bank deposit provided by the CBA. Unlike M-Pesa, M-Shwari 
was specially designed, regulated, and marketed as a savings service.57 A 
customer can obtain an interest rate of  six percent through her M-Shwari 
deposit.58 Further, M-Shwari deposits are fully protected by bank 
regulation.59 This functionality is useful for M-Pesa customers, who cannot 
obtain interest payments on their M-Pesa accounts, nor enjoy coverage from 
Kenya’s full body of bank regulation for their M-Pesa funds.60 
The second service provided by M-Shwari is a credit score, which CBA 
develops by leveraging information moving through the M-Pesa system.  
This information includes the “know-your-customer” details used to open 
 
 
54. Tamara Cook & Claudia McKay, How M-Shwari Works: The Story So Far, ACCESS TO FIN. 
FORUM 10 (Apr. 2015), https://www.cgap.org/research/publication/how-m-shwari-works-story-so-far 
[https://perma.cc/8XG3-SKMJ] 
55. Id. 
56. SAFARICOM, ANNUAL REPORT & GROUP ACCOUNTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH 
2012, 
https://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Annual_Reports/Annual_Report_2012_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2FDK-T3MM]. 
57. M-Shwari & KCB M-Pesa, SAFARICOM, https://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/do-
more-with-m-pesa/loans-and-savings [https://perma.cc/F2AF-NK3Q]. 
58. Id.  
59. Id.  
60. Olga Morawcynski, Why M-PESA Should Offer Savings Accounts, CGAP BLOG (Sept. 28, 
2009), https://www.cgap.org/blog/why-m-pesa-should-offer-savings-accounts [https://perma.cc/T9FC-
ARGU]. 
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an M-Pesa account.61 Thus, M-Shwari does not require borrowers to open a 
separate account or provide any additional physical material. 
 The CBA also monitors a customer’s use of M-Pesa, particularly the 
transaction history of buying and using mobile phone credit. This data is 
used for a dual purpose. The first is to allow borrowers to build their own 
credit history through a number of small transactions over a period of four 
to five months.62 Second, once sufficient history is built, the CBA uses this 
data to determine the amount of credit the borrower can initially access, 
which is then increased as the borrower begins repaying the initial loans.63   
 
Figure 1: M-Shwari Information Flow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CBA enforces loans in a graduated way, entirely remotely. A 
borrower can repay a loan anytime within thirty days of the initial date of 
taking out the loan.64 The CBA sends frequent text messages about 
upcoming loan repayment dates. It also sends a confirmation SMS after 
 
 
61. Id. 
62. How M-Shwari Works, COM. BANK OF AFR. (Jan. 2013), https://cbagroup.com/m-
shwari/how-m-shwari-works/ [https://perma.cc/U8JC-GJLN]. 
63. Id. 
64. COMMERCIAL BANK OF AFRICA, TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR THE OPENING AND USE OF 
THE M-SHWARI ACCOUNT [hereinafter M-SHWARI TERMS], https://cbagroup.com/m-shwari/terms-
and-conditions/ [https://perma.cc/YQ3E-JEHV]. 
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every transaction, and allows customers to check the loan balance via 
SMS.65  
The CBA also uses a graduated system of increasing interest rates. If a 
customer does not repay her loan by the end of day thirty, she receives a 
text message and is charged a 7.5% facilitation fee.66 The CBA’s text 
message also reminds the borrower that she will be reported to a credit 
bureau should she not repay her loan on time.67 If the borrower does not 
repay the loan in the next sixty days, funds in her M-Shwari deposit account 
are deducted as repayment of loan amount.68 The CBA also reminds the 
borrower that continued failure to repay the loan will result in a report to 
any of the three registered CRBs.69 After ninety days, the CBA sends a final 
text message reminder to the borrower. On the 120th day the CBA reports 
the person to the CRB and writes off the loan from its books.70  
M-Shwari grew rapidly in Kenya. By 2015 one fifth of Kenyans were 
using M-Shwari in some capacity, either to make deposits or access credit.71 
M-Shwari’s loan product increased its borrower base from 13,000 to 2.6 
million borrowers between its launch in 2013 and 2015.72 Other Kenyan 
banks soon launched similar products. For example, Kenya Commercial 
Bank used a lending app called KCB-MPESA to increase the number of 
loans granted from 200,000 in 2015, the year of its launch, to four million 
in 2018—a twenty-fold increase.73  
 
 
 
 
65. Safaricom, M-Shwari FAQs, SAFARICOM, https://www.safaricom.co.ke/faqs/faq/273 
[https://perma.cc/7GFR-9G2X] (last visited Sept. 19, 2019). 
66. M-SHWARI TERMS, supra note 64, at 4. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. It is important to note that a customer’s relationship with M-Pesa is not affected by non-
repayment of an M-Shwari loan. A Customer can still access h her M-Pesa account and use the money 
present in it. See Safaricom, supra note 65. 
71. EILIN FRANCIS, JOSHUA BLUMENSTOCK & JONATHAN ROBINSON, DIGITAL CREDIT IN 
EMERGING MARKETS A SNAPSHOT OF THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE AND OPEN RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
(2017). 
72. EDOARDO TOTOLO & PAUL GUBBINS, FSD KENYA, DIGITAL CREDIT IN KENYA: EVIDENCE 
FROM DEMAND-SIDE SURVEYS 3 (2018), https://fsdkenya.org/publication/digital-credit-in-kenya-
evidence-from-demand-side-surveys/ [https://perma.cc/KT5B-J2VE]. 
73.  Id. 
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B. Tala 
 
Tala is global fintech company which seeks to use technology in 
innovative ways to provide digital credit.74 In 2014, Tala launched its app 
in Kenya, which it uses to facilitate instant lending to customers.75 A 
customer first downloads the Tala app and grants access to her personal 
data.76 She then fills out a brief form with a set of eight personal questions.77 
Tala develops a credit score for each person by using a range of social-media 
related information, such as contact lists, call logs, photos, videos, social 
media accounts, text messages, call records, location, and social 
networking.78 A customer can access larger loan sizes after making regular 
repayments.79 
Tala uses two categories of data to provide loans: Android device data 
and behavioral data.80 This data is accessed directly from the customer’s 
Android mobile phone, with permission from the customer.81 Android data 
includes the device type, the operating system, and the apps on the phone.82 
Behavioral data, on the other hand, refers to the manner in which a borrower 
moves through the Tala app itself, including the kind of pages visited on the 
app.83 Machine learning algorithms determine the relative weight given to 
each individual data point.84 These algorithms are then in turn used to 
evaluate the data points picked up from the potential borrower’s phone to 
determine initial extent of the loan.85 
Tala also differs from M-Shwari in other ways. For example, Tala 
provides credit on an unsecured basis and does not have access to a 
customer’s savings balance, unlike the CBA’s access to funds in a 
 
 
74. TALA, https://tala.co.ke/about/ [https://perma.cc/TMZ2-KPDG]. 
75. Id. 
76. Privacy, TALA, https://tala.co/privacy-policy-ke/ [https://perma.cc/6RVS-LNZM]. 
77. Download the TALA Android App, TALA, https://tala.co.ke/tala-app-download-google-play-
store-kenya/ [https://perma.cc/5QLN-3AZ8]. 
78. Privacy, supra note 76. 
79. Tala Support, TALA, https://talasupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022064651-How-
can-I-increase-my-loan-limit- [https://perma.cc/VS3U-GE7N]. 
80.  Data Ethics at Tala, TALA, https://tala.co/data-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/4F8P-GUCX]. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. 
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customer’s M-Shwari deposit.86 Furthermore, Tala lends its own capital to 
customers, posing balance sheet risks for the firm. 87 Tala has grown rapidly. 
Since its launch in 2014, more than one million Kenyans have downloaded 
Tala from Kenya’s Google Store.88 Tala claims that it processes eighty-five 
percent of loan requests within ten minutes and has a ninety-two percent 
repayment rate.89  
 
Fig 2: Tala Information Flow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
86.  Gabriel Araujo, Tala: Providing Loans for Those Without a Financial Identity, HARV. BUS. 
INITIATIVE (Nov. 13, 2018), https://digital.hbs.edu/platform-rctom/submission/tala-providing-loans-
for-those-without-a-financial-identity/ [https://perma.cc/YB3F-LZNY]. 
87.  DM, Tala: Using Machine Learning to Provide Access to Credit for the World’s Unbanked, 
HARV. BUS. SCH.: DIGITAL INNOVATION & TRANSFORMATION (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://digital.hbs.edu/platform-digit/submission/tala-using-machine-learning-to-provide-access-to-
credit-for-the-worlds-unbanked/#_edn1 [https://perma.cc/KHQ2-S2RZ].  
88.  Ken Macharia, Mobile Lending App Tala Closes Sh6.5b Investment, to Expand to India and 
Mexico, CAPITAL FM (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2018/04/mobile-lending-
app-tala-closes-sh6-5b-investment-to-expand-to-india-and-mexico/ [http://perma.cc/9X8T-G2CU]. 
89.  This Startup Wants to Solve the Identity Verification Problem in Fin Services, CBINSIGHTS 
(June 21, 2018), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/tala-lending-identity-verification-future-fintech/ 
[http://perma.cc/997R-REWT]. 
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C. Branch 
 
Branch is an exclusively mobile-based credit lending platform. Branch 
primarily aims to target people with little to no credit history or savings.90 
Branch does so by involving a seemingly greater range of information than 
Tala to screen potential borrowers. The firm relies on smartphone data such 
as handset details, SMS logs, repayment history, GPS data, and contact lists 
to build a user’s financial risk profile.91  
Initially, customers can only borrow up to one thousand Kenyan shillings 
(Ksh) (approximately US$9.60), but this limit increases as the users 
regularly repay the amounts borrowed .92 A person downloads the Branch 
app, allows access to her smartphone data, creates an account, and applies 
for the required loan, which is usually approved in several minutes.93 Before 
the loan is approved, however, Branch uses its machine learning algorithms 
to process the data points collected and create a set of personalized loan 
options for the customer.94 In particular, Branch’s algorithms use a 
technique called “similarity detection,” which ties each account to a phone’s 
unique “digital fingerprint” to screen potential borrowers.95 A combination 
of the algorithms and the “digital fingerprint” allows Branch to provide 
small loans that are customized to each individual’s needs and 
creditworthiness while reducing the incidence of fraud96.  
Like Tala, Branch holds the loans on its own balance sheet.97  Branch 
does not securitize its loans.98 In case of a loan default, Branch retains the 
right to send the defaulter’s information to any of the credit reference 
bureaus, which ensures that the defaulter cannot borrow from any other 
 
 
90. How It Works, BRANCH, https://branch.co/how-it-works [http://perma.cc/8D3T-6MH6]. 
91. Id. 
92. Venic Nyanchama, Branch Loan Application, Interest Rates and Re-payment, TUKO (Oct. 
19, 2018), https://www.tuko.co.ke/288632-branch-loan-application-interest-rates-repayment.html 
[http://perma.cc/EEU4-HMK7]. 
93. How It Works, supra note 90. 
94. Id. 
95. Aswin Mannepalli, Tested by Adversity, Fintech Branch Emerges Stronger (And Better at 
Risk Management), FORBES (July 24, 2017, 5:29 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/aswinmannepalli/2017/07/24/tested-by-adversity-fintech-branch-
emerges-stronger-and-better-at-risk-management/#4caf36fefdd3 [perma.cc/7M9K-WJ9Q]. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
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financial platform or institution.99 Branch can also terminate any existing 
agreement that may exist with the defaulter.100 
 
Fig 3: Branch Information Flow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ability of each of these digital credit models to gather a wide range 
of information on Kenyans, including low-income and unbanked 
communities, is fueling a significant outreach of formal consumer credit. 
Doing so is consistent with Kenyan financial-inclusion goals. However, this 
spread has also created a range of regulatory issues, discussed in the next 
section.  
 
III. REGULATORY CHALLENGES  
CREATED BY FINTECH LENDING 
 
The rapid influx of fintech lending appears to create significant consumer 
protection problems. Such lending has been associated with inaccurate risk-
pricing as firms determine how to accurately process and use the vast range 
of information at their disposal and mitigate potential behavioral 
 
 
99. Terms of Use, BRANCH, https://branch.co/tou/ke [https://perma.cc/SS9D-2NLU]. 
100. Id. 
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problems.101 These factors have contributed to widespread default as low-
income communities, particularly the unbanked, access formal credit for the 
first time.102 Since the introduction of fintech lending, an estimated two 
million people have been reported to the Kenya Credit Bureau for failure to 
repay M-Shwari loans.103    
Empirical material on the impact of fintech lending on Kenya is relatively 
limited. The most substantive contribution is from the World Bank, which 
conducted a phone survey of over 1,100 digital borrowers in Kenya to better 
understand the market dynamics and risks associated with digital credit.104 
This presented a first-of-its kind dataset of loans in Kenya.  
This empirical material found that over fifty percent of the people who 
have borrowed money via digital credit firms in Kenya have repaid their 
due amounts late and twelve percent have defaulted.105 First time borrowers, 
who are usually drawn from low-income and unbanked populations, tend to 
default at the highest rates. Furthermore, these people tend to pay too early 
or too late, leading to higher annual percentage interest rates.106 For 
example, Branch charges monthly interest rates ranging from 2% to 16%, 
which translates to annual percentage rate between 12% and 180%.107 Such 
rates are generally higher than those charged by traditional Kenyan banks, 
which are capped by law at four percentage points above the bank lending 
rate (about 12.8% in 2018).108 Such interest rates charged by the fintech 
platforms can contribute to default given most borrowers in Kenya have no 
primary repayment mechanism and no collateral.109 
 
 
101. Juan Carlos Izaguirre, Michelle Kaffenberger & Rafe Mazer, It’s Time to Slow Digital 
Credit’s Growth in East Africa, CGAP: BLOG (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.cgap.org/blog/its-time-
slow-digital-credits-growth-east-africa [http://perma.cc/CA3J-M4W6]. 
102. Id. 
103. EILIN FRANCIS, JOSHUA BLUMENSTOCK & JONATHAN ROBINSON, DIGITAL CREDIT: A 
SNAPSHOT OF THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE AND OPEN RESEARCH QUESTIONS 2 (2017), 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/88r1j7sz [https://perma.cc/3S4B-EJZG]. 
104. Izaguirre et al., supra note 106. 
105. Id. 
106. Juan Carlos Izaguirre & Rafe Mazer, How Regulators Can Foster More Responsible Digital 
Credit, CGAP BLOG (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.cgap.org/blog/how-regulators-can-foster-more-
responsible-digital-credit [perma.cc/D5WK-SNUW]. 
107. Frequently Asked Questions, BRANCH, https://branch.co.ke/faq [perma.cc/76P4-R7KY]. 
108. James Ochieng, Interest Rate Cap Two Years On: Outcomes for Kenya’s Economy, KENYA 
INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. & ANALYSIS (Feb. 18, 2019), https://kippra.or.ke/interest-rate-cap-two-
years-on-outcomes-for-the-kenyan-economy/ [https://perma.cc/7A6H-KTLA]. 
109. Borrowing by Mobile Phone Gets Some Poor People into Trouble, ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 
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Furthermore, increased access to credit is amplifying the potential and 
probability that people will engage in excessive risk-taking.110 Such risk-
taking is particularly prevalent among first-time borrowers. These 
communities borrow for their private consumption, rather than income-
generating activities and enterprises.111 Only about thirty-three percent of 
the borrowers used credit for business purposes and only ten percent of 
borrowers used credit for emergencies.112 There is anecdotal evidence to 
suggest that a significant amount of borrowers use digital credit to fund 
gambling.113 In turn, this appears to lead to compounding debt problems. 
Sixteen percent of borrowers in Kenya had to borrow more money to pay 
off an existing digital loan.114  
At least part of this problem appears to emerge from lack of 
understanding of the terms of fintech loans. Around nineteen percent of the 
borrowers in Kenya stated they did not understand the costs and fees 
associated with their loans.115 Such lack of transparency makes it more 
difficult for users to make informed borrowing decisions, affecting their 
ability to repay.116  
Fintech lending also has created a regulatory gap in Kenya, meaning that 
fintechs operate with little if any substantive regulatory oversight.117 This is 
because there is no specific regulatory framework for digital lending.118  The 
CBK has authority to regulate bank-based consumer credit products such as 
M-Shwari.119 This is because a bank provides the relevant service and so is 
regulated as per Kenya’s Banking Act.120 However, it is less clear whether, 
 
 
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/11/17/borrowing-by-mobile-phone-
gets-some-poor-people-into-trouble [https://perma.cc/7BZS-Q6X8]. 
110. Id.  
111. Izaguirre et al., supra note 106. 
112. Id. 
113. Charles Mwaniki, Mobile Loan Borrowers Shun Betting, BUS. DAILY AFR. (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/datahub/Mobile-loan-borrowers-shun-betting/3815418-5169438-
qcivc3/index.html [https://perma.cc/U4T5-YGRF]. 
114. Izaguirre et al., supra note 106. 
115. Id. 
116. Mwaniki, supra note 113. 
117. Sejpal & Rebello, supra note 21. 
118. Id. 
119. Bank Supervision, CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, https://www.centralbank.go.ke/bank-
supervision/ [https://perma.cc/Q58K-CTRL]. 
120. Id. 
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and if so, how the CBK or other Kenyan policymakers can regulate 
specifically non-bank fintech lenders such as Branch or Tala. This is 
because related regulatory frameworks, such as the Central Bank of Kenya 
Act, the Banking Act, the National Payment Systems Act, and the Money 
Remittance Regulations do not specifically address fintech lenders.121 Such 
lenders are non-banks and so presumably do not fall under the Banking 
Act.122 Further, they provide more than payments and remittances and so 
will not be regulated wholly or exclusively through the National Payment 
Systems Act or the Money Remittance Regulations.123  
Policymakers have begun exploring reforms that can potentially address 
this regulatory gap in Kenya.124 Such explorations began in 2018, when the 
governor of the CBK, Patrick Njoroge, called for more extensive regulation 
of this sector.125 In the same year, the Kenyan government introduced new 
legislation, the Financial Markets Conduct Authority Bill, which aimed to 
create an independent regulator for the digital credit and finance sector.126 
This regulator, to be called the Financial Markets Conduct Authority 
(Authority), would be tasked with regulating and supervising the provision 
of financial products and services, including credit, to retail financial 
customers.127 The bill also provided the Authority with the power to issue 
licenses to launch digital financial products128 and to punish any platform or 
individual for contravening the bill.129 The bill did not put a cap on interest 
rates that can be charged by fintech platforms, but clarified that no lender 
can charge an interest rate that is higher than the one specified in the loan 
 
 
121. Sonal Sejpal & Dominic Rebelo, Kenya: Fintech 2019, INT’L COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDES 
(May 10, 2019), https://iclg.com/practice-areas/fintech-laws-and-regulations/Kenya 
[https://perma.cc/NM4W-DXGS].  
122. Herbling & Faux, supra note 44. 
123. Id. 
124. See, e.g. Maggie Fick, Kenya’s Central Bank Governor Calls for Regulation of Fintech 
Lenders, REUTERS (May 29, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-fintech/kenyas-central-
bank-governor-calls-for-regulation-of-fintech-lenders-idUSKCN1IU0N4 [https://perma.cc/8Z79-
FKTT]. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. The Financial Markets Conduct Bill (2018) § 13 (Kenya), 
http://www.treasury.go.ke/tax/finance-bills.html?download=784:draft-financial-markets-conduct-bill-
2018 [https://perma.cc/QG27-BQHL]. 
128. Id. § 37. 
129. Id.§§ 34-50. 
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contract.130 It also envisaged the establishment of a Financial Sector 
Ombudsman, with the power to hear and resolve complaints by retail 
financial customers against financial service providers, and prescribe a 
resolution either in the form of repayment or a change in the terms of the 
contract.131 
Kenya’s proposed regulatory frameworks require additional examination. 
For example, the relationship between the Authority and the CBK is not 
clear. The CBK has warned that the establishment of the Authority will 
mean banks can develop digital fintech products in ways that bypass 
traditional bank regulatory frameworks.132 This may be because fintech 
firms would not be subject to the kind of capital regulatory requirements, 
mandatory information disclosures, and public policy measures such as 
interest rates caps to which traditional banks are subject.133 Any overlapping 
jurisdictions may impede innovation because fintech firms may be unsure 
which regulator to contact to obtain the necessary permissions to launch a 
new product.134  
 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Kenyan policymakers have little guidance on how to address the 
regulatory challenges discussed in Part III, partly because of the recent focus 
on financial inclusion which involves extending rather than restricting the 
growth of digital credit. As discussed above, like policymakers in other 
developing countries, the CBK has financial inclusion goals, which involve 
 
 
130. Id.§ 87. 
131. Id.§ 134. 
132. Duncan Miriri, Kenya’s Proposed Regulator Will Not Infringe on Central Bank, Finance 
Minister Says, REUTERS (June 21, 2018), 
https://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFKBN1JH13H-OZABS [https://perma.cc/7WCP-
UAS6]. 
133. John Syekei, Kenyan Regulatory Net Widens to Include Fintech Lenders, BOWMANS (July 2, 
2018), https://www.bowmanslaw.com/insights/intellectual-property/kenyan-regulatory-net-widens-to-
include-fintech-lenders/ [https://perma.cc/QDL7-6YMQ]. 
134. Tamara Kalunda & Irene Hu, Groundbreaking New Policy and Regulatory Initiatives May 
Spur More Fintech Innovation in Kenya, FSD KENYA BLOG (July 5, 2018), 
https://fsdkenya.org/blog/groundbreaking-new-policy-and-regulatory-initiatives-may-spur-more-
fintech-innovation-in-kenya// [https://perma.cc/DM7B-BU6J]. 
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further exploring how to assist the continued spread of fintech and bank-
based lending throughout the Kenyan economy.135  
In relation to fintech lending, however, financial inclusion goals appear 
to conflict with other traditional regulatory objectives, such as consumer 
protection.136 For example, several legislators along with traditional banks 
in Kenya have proposed the introduction of interest rate caps on fintech 
credit.137 Traditional banks and financial institutions have been subject to 
similar caps since 2016.138 The Kenyan government has not taken up this 
proposal. For example, the Financial Markets Conduct Authority Bill does 
not mention any cap on the interest rates that fintech platforms may charge, 
but only mentions that such platforms cannot charge more than the rate 
mentioned in the initial loan contract.139  
While interest rate caps may contribute to consumer protection objectives 
by reducing over-indebtedness, such rules can create challenges for 
financial inclusion. This is because such rules reduce the compensation 
available to fintech lenders, which in turn may impede their ability to reach 
into unbanked and other low-income communities in Kenya.  
A second potential policy option is simplifying disclosure about digital 
consumer credit, a topic which has received policy attention.140 In theory, 
doing so can lead to more informed decision-making and fewer loan 
defaults. However, evidence from developed countries suggests that more 
streamlined or otherwise “improved” disclosure has little, if any, positive 
impact on behavioral practices and financial choices.141 Empirical literature 
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reports that those people in developed countries who are less well-educated 
tend to be more likely to make financial mistakes.142 Given much lower rates 
of general education and financial experience in Kenya than in developed 
countries, it appears that Kenyans are likely to be particularly prone to 
making mistakes, regardless of the quality of disclosure.143 
Moving forward, fresh thinking on regulatory proposals for fintech 
lending in Kenya and other developing countries is required. This thinking 
should differ from the type used for bank-based regulatory frameworks and 
focus on two components: studying the behavioral practices of low-income 
communities and determining which regulators should have jurisdiction 
over fintech lending. First, we need to better understand the way in which 
low-income communities, particularly the unbanked and other 
disadvantaged groups, process financial information, particularly in relation 
to loans.  
Second, another key starting point for regulatory frameworks involves 
determining which regulator or regulators in Kenya should have jurisdiction 
over fintech lending, which involves developing a “functional” approach. 
At least some of the regulatory confusion emerges because of a prevailing 
institutional approach, regulating firms based on their formal title. Such an 
approach creates confusion in relation to fintech lending because a firm that 
is not classified as a bank is providing a bank function—in this case, 
consumer credit.144 Moving forward, regulators should use a functional 
approach, which involves regulating firms based on their activities.145 In the 
case of fintech lending, this approach would enable Kenyan regulators to 
regulate the activities of consumer creditors in the same way, regardless of 
whether the firm was labeled as a “bank” or any other type of institution.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Fintech lending is growing in the United States and other developing 
countries, raising novel regulatory and supervisory issues that require 
attention. Such topics have attracted relatively limited policy and scholarly 
attention thus far.  
Developing regions, particularly in Africa, provide insights on the 
potential regulatory problems that can emerge when fintech lending 
becomes a much bigger proportion of overall credit. This emerges because 
the relative lack of banking outreach has created a vacuum into which such 
lending is already emerging. These same features mean that fintech lending 
is poised to grow much more into the future.146   
Kenya’s experience helps outline the wider benefits and costs with 
fintech lending enters fledgling credit markets. Access to appropriate, 
reliable credit can significantly enhance the economic opportunities 
available to low-income communities, particularly the unbanked.147 But it 
comes with significant risks, including inaccurate pricing as firms determine 
how to process and use the vast range of information at their disposal, as 
well as potential behavioral problems leading to widespread default.148 The 
service also appears to create regulatory gaps because existing intellectual 
silos continue to focus on consumer credit emerging from the banking 
sector, not fintechs.149 
Determining appropriate regulatory responses to fintech advancements is 
complicated and requires additional research. A useful starting point 
involves more empirical material on behavioral problems amongst Kenyans 
and other developing countries—particularly amongst lower-income 
communities who seem to default the most on new loans.  
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